Immediately prior to the Munich Security Conference, the Trump administration did what might be considered a quiet diplomatic masterstroke. It sent letters to European capitals asking them two specific questions: What they would be willing to provide to Ukraine, in order to contribute to the negotiation process and to be, in their own words, the adults in the room? And what they would be interested in doing, once the war ends, provided that the U.S. isn’t willing to provide peacekeeping forces to keep the peace in Ukraine?
The result was chaotic, from European condescension about American isolationism and unilateralism—even though they are somewhat contradictory—to a European attempt towards a “coalition of the willing” trip-wire force to provide peacekeeping in Ukraine post-armistice, which has not so far materialized due to the minor but notable disadvantage of American unwillingness to oversee the process.
Yet the Europeans have managed to do something to wreck the peace process so far. While they cannot wage the war, they are perfectly capable of continuing to fund Ukrainian war aims, and thus far they have continued to do so, frustrating the American attempts towards a grand bargain with Russia. A recent report from the Economist demonstrates this tension:
Another sign of the times is that Pentagon figures recently questioned one ally about why it was still supplying weapons to Ukraine—a challenge that was ignored. Diplomats in Washington also report that some Trump aides say privately that they are “fed up” with Europe’s effort to strengthen Ukraine.
It shouldn’t be so, but it is, for a few reasons. The administration wanted an easy win in Ukraine, but the president is hamstrung by two competing interests in this case. In his own cabinet, other than Vice President J.D. Vance and his special envoy Steve Witkoff, no one seems to share his appetite for a grand bargain with Russia and a retrenchment from Europe. In fact, time and time again it appears he is being second-guessed by everyone from Secretary of State Marco Rubio to National Security Advisor Mike Waltz to the special envoy Keith Kellogg, almost all of whom are more hawkish on Russia than the president. The bellum omnium contra omnes onslaught against Europe on trade didn’t help either. Sticks should usually be accompanied by carrots. Instead, his tariff hostility was all sticks and no carrots, and resulted in Europe banding together to frustrate his peace initiative with Russia.
Finally, the Russians don’t trust Americans anyway, and are rightly worried about American domestic volatility and public passions; any peace deal negotiated by this administration might be discarded by the next without an act of Congress. As Hans Morgenthau noted, a rational grand strategy of a great power is incompatible with public passions. Autocratic states do not face that issue, and can determine their long-term grand strategy without having to worry about public opinion. Democratic states cannot do that without a treaty or an act of legislature. Trump is therefore at a disadvantage, trying to navigate diplomacy in a feudal way, but from within the confines of a legislative democracy.
Nevertheless, there is a way out. There are two logical ways to regain the peace momentum. First is the current approach, in which negotiations are ongoing while the war continues. One cannot be very optimistic about the end result. The process has too many cooks who can spoil the broth. A simpler solution is to set a date for a ceasefire—the Korean War or First World War model of peace. President Trump needs a win before the midterms. He can order his envoys to send another letter to European capitals, Kiev, and Moscow, setting a date for a ceasefire.
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July 4, American Independence Day, is a good date. The process is simple. There will be a ceasefire and troop pullout from both sides, creating what would be a de facto DMZ along the line of contact. The occupied areas by Russia will remain as they are. The U.S. will stop any further aid, martial or financial, to Ukraine. The war will stop on a date and time fixed, similar to the First World War, and the negotiations will continue after about a future order and peacekeeping. If either Europe or Russia refuses to follow through, the U.S. will follow the advice of one of the greatest IR grand-strategists of this country, Kelly Clarkson, and “just walk away.”
The structural reality is this: Europe isn’t capable of continuing the war without America, and, without America, European unity will split. If the Europeans do attempt to continue the war, the burden of the peace process should be on them as well. On the other hand, Russia is incapable of conquering the entirety of Ukraine.
It is not an American burden to bring all parties to the table and satiate their whims and changing war aims. The American president came to power committing to peace in Ukraine, but more than that, his commitment was to extricating American from the conflicts in Europe and the Middle East. There’s no potential loss here for him. If there is a ceasefire, he can claim that he achieved peace as he promised, and any breakdown of the ceasefire in future will not be on him. If there is no ceasefire, he can still blame Europe and Russia for not accepting his peace overtures. In 1904, President Theodore Roosevelt made a “proclamation of neutrality” during the war between Russia and Japan, arguing that “the United States are on terms of friendship and amity with both the contending powers.” It was a beautiful strategy executed well; it eventually compelled Japan and Russia to seek American stewardship of the peace process. But in order for them to come to that point, the U.S. had to let them wage war for a while first without interfering. It is time to return to that sage wisdom. Just propose a fixed date and time for a ceasefire, and then walk away, Mr. President.
