When Chinese Gen. Zhang Youxia visited the sprawling U.S. infantry base at Fort Benning, Georgia, in 2012, he leaped at the chance to fire an American M240 machine gun, unlike other generals in the delegation.
A distinguished combat veteran of China’s 1979 war with Vietnam and later battles, General Zhang stood out in the People’s Liberation Army, the military wing of the Communist Party and an organization imbued with political commissars at every level. His battlefield credentials made General Zhang a natural to help lead a campaign to modernize the PLA and ready it to “fight and win” wars after he and Chinese leader Xi Jinping were elevated, a few months later, to China’s powerful Central Military Commission (CMC).
Yet those strengths – as well as his close family ties with Mr. Xi – did not save General Zhang from a dramatic downfall this past week. As vice chairman of the CMC, second only to Mr. Xi in the PLA command, and as Mr. Xi’s chief military adviser, General Zhang became one of the highest-ranking PLA officers to be investigated for corruption and disloyalty as part of Mr. Xi’s sweeping purge of the Chinese military.
Why We Wrote This
For years, China has been working to tackle widespread corruption within its massive army. But with the toppling of a popular general and former ally, Chinese leader Xi Jinping may be sacrificing military readiness to bolster his own power.
“It’s a huge deal … a Shakespearean moment in Chinese politics,” says Jonathan Czin, a China expert at the Brookings Institution.
And one that has ripple effects far beyond the fall of a single general. The unprecedented purge will likely go after officers associated with General Zhang next, affecting morale within China’s rapidly expanding military, one of the world’s largest and most formidable armed forces. For China-watchers, this week’s developments offer a rare glimpse into the inner workings of the military, suggesting that a Taiwan invasion is not imminent. It could also signal that political infighting is intensifying as Mr. Xi heads toward a fourth five-year term in 2027, with no clear successor.
Ousting General Zhang marks “a real shift,” says Mr. Czin, a former senior analyst of Chinese politics for the U.S. intelligence community. “This is really Xi going after one of his own,” he says. “Nobody is safe … and it shows just how cold-blooded Xi is willing to be.”
Turning on an old friend
Both Mr. Xi and General Zhang are “princelings,” or sons of revolutionary leaders, and their fathers were comrades during China’s Civil War. They were friends growing up in nearby compounds in Beijing, and Mr. Xi promoted General Zhang, seen as his closest military adviser, in 2022, and kept him on past the retirement age.
General Zhang “had everything Xi could want – loyalty, pedigree, intelligence, respect, and a long-standing relationship,” says Drew Thompson, a senior fellow at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies in Singapore, who hosted General Zhang’s 2012 U.S. visit as director for China at the U.S. Defense Department. “Obviously, something came between them.”
A Sunday editorial in the official PLA Daily accused General Zhang and his protégé and fellow combat veteran, Gen. Liu Zhenli, of disloyalty. It stated they “seriously trampled upon and undermined the CMC Chairman Responsibility System” – a reference to Mr. Xi’s leadership – and endangered Communist Party rule.
Mr. Xi sent a message with the harsh and public disgracing of General Zhang, who could have been allowed to retire quietly, Mr. Czin says. While China’s high-level politics are shrouded in secrecy, some experts believe General Zhang’s influence is such that Mr. Xi may have been concerned he could act as an alternative kingmaker if he and his network were not thoroughly discredited. General Zhang also sits on the party’s powerful ruling Politburo.
The Yomiuri Shimbun/AP/File
Yet on a practical level, he “was the one active-duty PLA officer who could give Xi the best, most objective advice” about PLA capabilities and shortcomings, the risks of a Taiwan invasion, and “the human cost of military conflict,” Mr. Thompson says.
Indeed, both General Zhang and General Liu “were very rare commodities in the PLA today,” says Shanshan Mei, a political scientist at Rand specializing in Chinese defense policy. Their front-line experience was “very much in alignment with the direction of where [Mr. Xi] wanted the PLA to go,” she says.
The bombshell announcement leaves the CMC with only two members – instead of the usual seven – at the pinnacle of China’s 2 million-strong military: Mr. Xi, the chairman, and Gen. Zhang Shengmin, a career political commissar who runs the Discipline Inspection Commission, the chief investigator running Mr. Xi’s anti-corruption drive.
Corruption has long been widespread within the PLA, fueled in recent decades by “a tsunami of money” to support China’s military buildup, says Evan Sankey, a policy analyst at the Cato Institute focused on U.S. policy toward China.
The latest wave of high-level purges started in 2023 and focused on misconduct by senior leaders of China’s strategic-missile force and equipment department. It expanded to topple China’s then-defense minister, Li Shangfu, and in October 2025, nine other top generals were dismissed.
Mr. Xi has used the anti-corruption campaign as a political tool to eliminate rivals – real or perceived – and steadily increase his dominance. And General Zhang’s investigation takes this to a new level.
Will this weaken China’s army?
The fall of General Zhang, who was highly regarded inside the PLA, is likely to hurt the military’s esprit de corps, experts say.
“This is a big blow to morale and trust in the PLA,” says Dr. Mei. “Everyone will be panicking and risk-averse.”
Mark Schiefelbein/AP/File
And while day-to-day military operations such as training and exercises are unlikely to be impacted, experts say Mr. Xi’s hollowing out of the CMC could mean that a major military campaign, such as an invasion of Taiwan, is less likely at present. Even reconstituting the CMC by promoting younger, less seasoned officers will take time.
“Without an experienced leadership that trusts one another, it would be very difficult for him [Mr. Xi] to have command and control over a force in a very dynamic wartime situation,” says Mr. Thompson.
China’s ultimate aim of unifying with Taiwan – the island democracy of 23 million people that the Communist-led government claims as its territory but has never ruled – will not change, says Dr. Mei. “But who is going to command this kind of complex operation?”
The personnel shake-up suggests that in the short term, Mr. Xi may not have “a big plan to wage a war” over Taiwan, she says. “I don’t think it’s logical for anyone who wants to do that now to gut your own high command.”
