The Persian Parade of Horribles

Six months before the United States launched Operation Iraqi Freedom to disarm Iraq and remove the regime of Saddam Hussein, then-U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld prepared a memorandum for President George W. Bush outlining “potential problems” which might arise from the conflict. Many of the 29 potential negative developments Rumsfeld proffered that autumn would prove prescient. This memorandum, now declassified and available through the National Security Archive, disproves the contention that senior American policymakers failed to anticipate the myriad challenges the United States might face in Iraq. Known now as the “Parade of Horribles,” this document confirms that policymakers foresaw but failed to prepare for the complications that often follow close on the heels of hostilities. 

As President Donald Trump weighs the decision to commit the United States to a strike on Iran, American planners and policymakers might consider a modern “Parade of Horribles” that could follow another foray into the greater Middle East. This list, though far from exhaustive, could help prepare the United States for problematic developments which might arise once the dust settles over Fordow. It might even convince Washington to renew its efforts to reach a diplomatic solution to the present crisis. In any event, the due consideration and planning for potential problems is prudent: 

June 19, 2025
8:45 AM

SUBJECT: Iran: An Illustrative List of Potential Problems to be Considered and Addressed 

Following is an illustrative list of the types of problems that could result from a conflict with Iran. It is offered simply as a checklist so that they are part of the deliberations. 

1. American strikes could fail to cripple the Iranian nuclear program, driving the program deeper underground and prompting Tehran to sprint for a bomb. 

2. An Iranian nuclear breakout could trigger regional nuclear proliferation, further destabilizing the Middle East and exacerbating the fragile balance of power. 

3. If the initial American strikes are unsuccessful, Israel may attempt to compel the United States to commit to a longer campaign to cripple or overthrow the Iranian regime. 

4. Iran could retaliate against U.S. bases in the region, killing or wounding American troops and necessitating an escalatory response. 

5. Iran could launch strikes against Saudi Arabia, targeting oil refineries and deepening shocks to global energy supplies. 

6. Iran could close the Straits of Hormuz, triggering a global energy crisis and further exacerbating inflation. This would strengthen Russian leverage over Europe and could force the United States to commit significant resources to reopen the Straits, further weakening its deterrent posture in the Indo-Pacific. 

7. As the largest consumer of Iranian crude, China might intervene to restore the flow of oil through the Persian Gulf. 

8. Houthi rebels could increase their attacks in the Bab al-Mandab, another strategic chokepoint, compounding the shock to global supply chains.  

9. Regional unrest could trigger another wave of mass migration into Europe.

10. Turkey could capitalize on regional unrest to expand its presence in northern Syria or move to further suppress Kurdish populations along its border.  

11. Sunni terrorist groups (e.g. ISIS, Al Qaeda) across the Islamic world would receive a reprieve. They could reconsolidate and launch external operations, including from the borderlands between Iran, Afghanistan, and Pakistan.  

12. While the U.S. is tied down in the Middle East, China, Russia, or North Korea could move against American allies and interests, raising the prospect of a great power war. 

13. American capacity to contain an increasingly assertive and aggressive China in the Indo-Pacific could be undermined.

14. A war with Iran would divert American resources and national attention from vital domestic priorities (e.g. Golden Dome, infrastructure, securing the southern border).

15. U.S. defense investments needed to modernize the Joint Force for sustained strategic competition with China would be diverted into short-term tactical needs. 

16. The United States might be unable to maintain escalation dominance over a coalition of hostile states, especially if the war expands beyond the Middle East. 

17. A protracted war against Iran would deplete already dwindling stocks of American munitions, weakening deterrence in Europe and the Indo-Pacific.  

18. Sectarian tensions across the Middle East between could be enflamed, triggering sectarian violence in neighboring states (e.g. Iraq, Syria, Lebanon).

19. The Iranian people might “rally around the flag”, further strengthening the control of the Khamenei regime. 

20. Higher than expected collateral damage could turn global public opinion against the United States, weakening its standing and prestige across the Global South. 

21. Iran could plan or encourage attacks on the American homeland, committing the United States to massive retaliation and regime change.  

22. The United States and Israel could achieve “catastrophic success” in the form of a sudden implosion of the Iranian regime, creating a power vacuum in Iran. Ethnic separatism and chaos could spread across the region, destabilizing fragile neighboring states. 

23. Opportunistic non-state actors could launch cyberattacks against the United States, causing significant economic damage and chaos at home. 

24. An emboldened Russia might attempt a knockout offensive against Ukraine or move against a vulnerable NATO member (e.g. Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia). 

25. A longer or more intensive war than anticipated could foment domestic unrest in the United States, further dividing the nation. 

26. Iranian proxies across the Middle East might launch attacks against American and Israeli interests, further stretching American resources. 

27. Facing the fall of their regime, Iranian leaders might embrace a nihilistic strategy of maximum destruction similar to the so-called Samson Option. 

28. If the Iranian nuclear program is crippled, the regime might seek deterrence through the development of chemical, biological, or radiological weapons, which might prove more dangerous. 

29. The war could prove more expensive than anticipated, further straining American financial resources and compounding the already enormous national debt. 

President Trump has prudently resisted pressure to wade into this war without exhausting diplomatic alternatives. As Winston Churchill once warned, “The Statesman who yields to war fever must realise that once the signal is given, he is no longer the master of policy but the slave of unforeseeable and uncontrollable events.”

It might well be that none of these “horribles” come to pass and the bunker-busters decisively cut the Gordian knot of Iranian nuclear ambitions. But if past is prologue, this war might prove to be a tougher and longer fight than many contend. It is in our national interest to weigh these possibilities, and if they fail to tip the scales toward negotiation, we must at least prepare to address them to the fullest extent possible.