The special prosecutor mechanism, intended as a safeguard against executive corruption since the Watergate era, has turned into a farce filled with politicization, witch hunts, scope creep, endless delays, and a focus on easy targets while letting the powerful go free. Even worse, many investigations end with weak reports that sit unused, serving political show rather than justice. Tactics like entrapment, where prosecutors allegedly manipulate witnesses or defendants into crimes, further damage credibility, as seen in high-profile cases, like those of General Michael Flynn and Roger Stone.
Amid July 2025 reports of FBI criminal investigations into former FBI Director James Comey and ex-CIA Director John Brennan for potential false statements and misconduct in the 2016 Russia probe — potentially escalating to a special prosecutor appointment — and President Trump’s claims linking “made-up” Jeffrey Epstein files to abuses of power by Comey, Brennan, President Barack Obama, and others in weaponizing government agencies, historical precedent delivers a stark warning: DO NOT appoint a special prosecutor, as the likely outcome is endless delays, prosecutions of peripheral low-hanging fruit, entrapment ops, and reports that fail to hold the mighty accountable.
This article examines these failures across different administrations, using historical critiques to show that the system not only fails but also actively erodes public trust in accountability. Instead of being neutral overseers, special counsels often act as instruments for partisan vendettas, producing reports that indict no one of consequence and prosecutions that target the periphery.
Richard Nixon (1969–1974): Foundational Flaws Exposed
Watergate’s Archibald Cox and Leon Jaworski investigations created the role of special prosecutor but immediately revealed its weaknesses. Politicization reached its peak with Nixon’s “Saturday Night Massacre,” when he fired Cox to stop the tapes subpoena — an open executive overreach that seemed like a cover-up. Nixon’s “witch hunt” claims foreshadowed future defenses, yet delays in the investigation, due to privilege disputes, paralyzed the nation until the 1974 Supreme Court ruling. Easy targets included aides like John Mitchell and H.R. Haldeman, who were convicted, but Nixon left without facing consequences, avoiding trial. Jaworski’s reports described the cover-up, but without prosecuting the president, they mostly became historical footnotes rather than moments of real justice. Aggressive pressure on witnesses suggested coercive tactics that would influence later investigations.
Gerald Ford (1974–1977): Pardons Nullify the Process
Ford’s continuation of Jaworski’s Watergate wrap-up was halted by his Nixon pardon, a politicized move that made the special prosecutor’s efforts meaningless. This executive pardon protected the president, turning thorough investigations into reports without real impact. Critics condemned it as a witch hunt stopped for convenience, showing how the system fails when presidents step in. Easy targets — convictions of remaining aides — highlighted the imbalance: Minor players were punished while the mastermind walked free. The result demonstrated how reports can be powerless documents, failing to bring closure or serve as a warning.
Jimmy Carter (1977–1981): Trivial Pursuits and Wasted Resources
Early Independent Counsel Act tests under Carter, like Paul Curran’s peanut warehouse probe and Arthur Christy’s Hamilton Jordan investigation, exemplified overreach on minor issues. Politicized by Republicans eager to smear Carter’s ethics push, these were dismissed as witch hunts, with reports concluding no wrongdoing after needless delays. The focus on easy targets — baseless allegations — wasted taxpayer money, producing only exoneration reports that mocked the system’s seriousness. Jordan’s case, triggered by anonymous tips, smacked of entrapment-like setups, foreshadowing even more serious abuses.
Ronald Reagan (1981–1989): Epic Delays and Pardoned Principals
Lawrence Walsh’s Iran-Contra investigation lasted seven years and cost around $47 million — about $104 million in 2025 dollars — due to extensive scope creep into national security details. Reagan’s label as a witch hunt persisted amid Democratic politicization, but convictions of Oliver North and John Poindexter (later overturned) targeted lower-level figures, while Reagan remained unscathed. Entanglement claims emerged from Walsh’s immunity deals that backfired, forcing testimony that fell apart on appeal. The final report named higher-ups but led nowhere, thanks to George H.W. Bush’s pardons — a clear failure where thorough investigations produce reports that go nowhere, letting key figures escape justice.
George H.W. Bush (1989–1993): Executive Interference Writ Large
Bush’s inheritance of Walsh’s probe culminated in his 1992 pardons, politicizing the process by halting prosecutions and shielding allies like Caspar Weinberger. This made Walsh’s report a damning but toothless document, implying Bush’s involvement without consequence. Witch hunt accusations flew as delays from Reagan’s era built up, with scope creep probing into Bush’s past. Low-hanging fruit in the HUD scandal — convictions of aides — avoided implicating HUD Secretary Samuel Pierce, showing the system’s bias toward peripheral figures. Reports, not actual reckonings, marked the failure here.
Bill Clinton (1993–2001): Scope Creep’s Poster Child
Kenneth Starr’s Whitewater investigation developed into the Monica Lewinsky scandal, a clear example of scope creep that cost $70 million — approximately $138.5 million in 2025 dollars — and distracted the nation for years. Clinton’s “witch hunt” rhetoric highlighted Republican politicization, with delays fueling impeachment drama. Associates were easy targets and were convicted on unrelated charges, but Clinton’s acquittal revealed the prosecutions as selective. Entrapment was possible in Kenneth Starr’s pressure on Lewinsky, coercing her cooperation. The 1998 report led to impeachment but not removal, illustrating how reports can be used as political weapons that fail to produce lasting accountability.
George W. Bush (2001–2009): Commutations and Inaction
Patrick Fitzgerald’s Plame leak probe convicted Scooter Libby on perjury — not the leak — highlighting easy targets while figures like Vice President Dick Cheney avoided scrutiny. Bush’s commutation politicized the result, making justice feel superficial. John Durham’s CIA torture tapes destruction investigation resulted in a report with no charges, emphasizing delays and failures to prosecute given national security sensitivities. The system’s weakness was evident.
Barack Obama (2009–2017): Reports Burying Potential Crimes
Durham’s expanded CIA investigation under Obama concluded with a report citing “insufficient evidence” for charges, despite interrogation abuses — a clear failure to hold those in power accountable. Politicization simmered as critics accused Attorney General Eric Holder of soft-pedaling, leading to delays and inaction. The report’s lack of force exemplified the system’s reluctance to take action, fueling later conspiracy theories.
Donald Trump (2017–2021, 2025–present): Entrapment and Witch Hunts on Steroids
Robert Mueller’s Russia probe, branded a witch hunt by Trump, devolved into scope creep on obstruction, with delays until 2019. Low-hanging fruit prosecutions dominated: Associates, like Paul Manafort, were convicted on unrelated financial crimes, while no collusion charges materialized against Trump. The report outlined evidence but deferred, citing DOJ policy — a cowardly cop-out that failed to deliver.
Entrapment operations hit new lows. In General Flynn’s case, FBI agents allegedly set him up during a January 2017 interview, discussing how to “get him to lie” without warnings, which led to a guilty plea later withdrawn amid misconduct claims. The DOJ dropped charges in 2020, citing entrapment and bias, exposing the probe as a sham. Roger Stone’s conviction for lying and tampering resulted from aggressive tactics, including a predawn raid critics called theatrical entrapment, focusing on process crimes rather than the main allegations.
These cases show how special counsels ensnare peripheral figures with coerced testimony, yielding reports that indict narratives, not the leaders. John Durham’s counter-probe, politicized as Trump’s revenge, ended in minor convictions and a report lambasted for failing to uncover systemic abuse, further proving the system’s inefficacy. As of July 2025, DOJ shake-ups in Trump’s second term signal efforts to either dismantle or weaponize such failures.
Joe Biden (2021–2025): Reports as Political Smears
Robert Hur’s documents probe released a 2024 report criticizing Biden’s memory but not charging him — serving as a partisan jab disguised as analysis, politicized by Republicans as an attempt to cover-up the truth. This highlights how reports can fail justice and become tools for attacks. Jack Smith’s Trump cases, dismissed in 2025 after the election, targeted superficial issues like document mishandling but fell apart due to immunity rulings — a systemic failure. David Weiss’s investigation into Hunter Biden, involving tax and gun charges, has been hampered by entrapment allegations from whistleblowers claiming interference.
A Damning Verdict: Time to Scrap the System
Special counsels consistently fail spectacularly: Their self-important reports pontificate endlessly without ever holding the true perpetrators accountable; low-hanging fruit prosecutions merely inflate conviction numbers to justify bloated budgets, and entrapment schemes undermine any claim of fairness, as clearly shown in the Flynn and Stone cases. From Mueller’s intensive investigation to Hur’s petty criticisms, this corrupt system doesn’t just breed cynicism — it creates a crisis of confidence, calling for radical reform or outright abolition to restore some genuine accountability. Appointing a special counsel to investigate Obama, Brennan, Comey, and their associates’ alleged abuses will inevitably blow up in a disastrous backfire, dragging on for years with probably no real results. Meanwhile, the only winners would be the shady lawyers, raking in millions from desperate clients.
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