There’s a smug chorus coming from Conservative ranks: “Now Reform will have to actually run things.” The implication being that once Reform UK assumes control of local authorities, their populist promises will collapse under the weight of practical governance, exposing them as equally incompetent.
This logic misses several crucial points. Look at Brighton, where Green Party governance has been objectively problematic, yet they‘ve successfully deflected blame while maintaining voter support. The Greens have positioned themselves as fighting against hostile external forces, and Brighton’s electorate continues to back them precisely because of their ideological alignment, not despite it.
Reform-controlled councils are likely to follow a similar playbook. Their success won’t be measured by conventional competence metrics but by how vigorously they‘re seen to battle for their voters’ priorities against perceived establishment opposition. In fact, noisy, public confrontations with central government, particularly over hot-button issues like asylum hotels, will only strengthen their narrative as champions of local interests against an overreaching Westminster.
The more that Labour ministers try to impose policies on Reform councils, the more ammunition they provide for Reform’s anti-establishment positioning. Far from exposing Reform’s limitations, these conflicts may well cement their support in what we’ll soon be calling their heartland councils.
As part of their main batch of initial pledges, Reform has boldly set out to block asylum seekers from being housed in hotels within areas under the control of their councils. Nigel Farage vowed to “resist” asylum seekers being housed in counties under Reform control, while the party’s chairman Zia Yusuf mentioned using “judicial reviews, injunctions, planning laws” to achieve this goal.
Can they actually deliver on this promise? Or would such actions require councils to “go rogue” against central government?
The origins of asylum dispersal policy
To understand the current tension, we have to go back to how the current asylum accommodation policy was developed. Prior to 1999, asylum seekers were supported under the mainstream benefits system, and housing was primarily provided by local authorities. The Immigration and Asylum Act 1999 marked a significant shift by centralising this support under the National Asylum Support Service (NASS), operated by the Home Office.
This centralisation aimed to address what the government perceived as two key problems: the concentration of asylum seekers in London and the South East, and the inconsistent support provided by different local authorities. The 1999 Act introduced a “dispersal policy” designed to distribute asylum seekers more evenly across the UK, moving them away from pressure points in the Southeast to areas with available housing. This was seen as a failure almost immediately. Within months of the scheme’s start, the Home Secretary, Jack Straw, wrote to Tony Blair, saying: “We are taking a big hit on asylum in Labour areas. Dispersal of asylum seekers around the country is necessary. But it has also dispersed asylum as a political issue.” Despite attempts by Straw’s successor, David Blunkett, to change the policy — contracts were renewed and the dispersal system lived on.
Initially, local authorities could choose whether to participate in this dispersal scheme. However, in April 2022, facing unprecedented pressure on the asylum system, the Home Office announced a “full dispersal model” making all local authority areas asylum dispersal areas. Under this model, the allocation of asylum seekers is meant to be proportionate to the population size of the area, though the practical implementation has been criticised as uneven — with most accommodation being concentrated in poorer areas.
The use of hotels as a significant asylum accommodation option was originally intended as a temporary contingency measure during the COVID-19 pandemic but expanded dramatically due to the backlog in processing asylum claims and increases in Channel crossings. By January 2025, over 38,079 asylum seekers were housed in hotels across the UK at a cost of approximately £5-6 million per day, with 70,986 being kept in other kinds of accommodation.
The burden on local authorities
When asylum seekers are placed in a local authority area, the impact extends far beyond simply having additional people present. These burdens include:
- Financial Pressures: While the Home Office funds direct accommodation costs via contractors, local authorities bear significant additional expenses. These include education services for asylum-seeking children, public health initiatives, community cohesion programs, and translation services. The funding provided by central government to offset these costs is often criticised as inadequate.
- Housing Market Impacts: The acquisition of hotels and properties for asylum accommodation can affect local housing markets, potentially reducing availability for tourism in seaside towns or removing housing stock from the private rental sector.
- Service Delivery Challenges: Local services such as GP practices, mental health services, and schools may experience increased demand without corresponding increases in resources or staff. This can strain already stretched local services.
- Planning and Infrastructure Pressures: The sudden conversion of properties to house asylum seekers can create unplanned pressures on local infrastructure, from waste management to transportation.
- Community Cohesion Issues: Local authorities often find themselves managing community tensions, particularly in areas where large numbers of asylum seekers are placed with minimal consultation or preparation.
- Safeguarding Responsibilities: Councils retain legal duties for safeguarding all vulnerable individuals in their area, including asylum seekers, but may struggle to fulfill these effectively without additional resources.
The frustration expressed by local authorities often stems not just from the presence of asylum seekers but from the perception that central government has imposed these responsibilities without adequate funding, consultation, or consideration of local circumstances — particularly considering it is often the least well-off local authorities who are taking the most asylum seekers.
The Central-Local Government Legal Framework
Local councils derive their powers from legislation such as the Local Government Act 2000 and the Localism Act 2011, which granted them a “general power of competence.” However, this power is significantly constrained when intersecting with national policy areas like immigration and asylum.
The Immigration and Asylum Act 1999 places a statutory duty on the Home Secretary to provide accommodation and support to destitute asylum seekers while their claims are being processed. This duty exists regardless of local council preferences, and the Home Office typically contracts private providers like Serco to source this accommodation.
The planning law approach: material change of use
Much like anything gets blocked in the UK, Reform’s most technically viable path lies in planning regulations — specifically arguing that converting hotels to asylum accommodation constitutes a “material change of use” requiring planning permission. When hotels are repurposed to house asylum seekers, local authorities can argue this represents a change from Class C1 (hotels) to Class C2A (secure residential institutions) or Sui Generis (hostels).
Recent case law shows mixed outcomes with this approach:
Great Yarmouth Borough Council v Al-Abdin (2022)
In December 2022, Great Yarmouth secured a significant victory when Mr. Justice Holgate upheld an injunction preventing the use of the Villa Rose Hotel and other hotels within a protected seafront area for housing asylum seekers. The council successfully argued that such use would undermine its specific planning policy (GY6) designed to protect the town’s vital tourism economy. The judge noted that using hotels for asylum accommodation in this zone would constitute a material change of use, emphasising the importance of the seafront policy area to the local economy.
The court emphasised that the “apprehended breach of planning control has a flagrant character” and accepted evidence regarding the importance of the tourist economy to Great Yarmouth, especially following the challenging periods of the COVID pandemic and economic downturn.
Ipswich Borough Council v Fairview Hotels and East Riding of Yorkshire Council v LGH Hotels (2022)
Just one month earlier, however, the High Court refused to continue injunctions in similar cases brought by Ipswich Borough Council and East Riding of Yorkshire Council. In these instances, Justice Holgate noted that the “distinction between hotel and hostel use in a case of the present kind is fine”. He concluded that the council had not established that any change was material or that there would be substantial planning harm.
The court observed that in both cases, the proposed uses would not cause environmental damage, harm to neighboring amenities, character of the area, or traffic issues, nor would there be changes to the buildings themselves.
The key differentiator: Specific planning policies and economic impact
What distinguished Great Yarmouth’s successful case was the existence of a specific planning policy (GY6) protecting a designated seafront area, backed by compelling evidence of economic importance. The judge specifically noted that Policy GY6 is “a highly specific, protective policy directed to a large and highly important sector of the Borough’s economy”.
This suggests that Reform UK councils would need to establish not just a general objection to housing asylum seekers, but demonstrate specific planning harms based on existing local plan policies and provide robust economic evidence to support their claims.
What would “going rogue” actually look like?
If Reform UK councils decided to take direct action against central government policy, several scenarios could unfold:
Scenario 1: Direct Obstruction
Reform councils might instruct their planning enforcement officers to issue immediate stop notices or enforcement notices against hotels housing asylum seekers, regardless of whether a strong legal case exists for a material change of use. They could also refuse to process necessary licenses or permits for these properties.
The consequences would likely be swift. The Home Office or its contractors would challenge these actions in court, and given the statutory duty to house asylum seekers, judges would likely rule against the councils. If councils persisted, central government could invoke powers under the Local Government Act 1999 to appoint commissioners who would take over these functions, effectively removing the council’s authority in this area.
Scenario 2: Administrative Resistance
A more subtle approach might involve creating administrative hurdles — excessive inspections, deliberate delays in processing paperwork, or imposing onerous local requirements on properties housing asylum seekers. Councils might also withhold complementary services or support that would normally be provided.
This approach would likely lead to legal challenges from both the Home Office and potential judicial reviews from advocacy groups. If sustained, it could result in findings of maladministration by the Local Government Ombudsman or intervention by the Secretary of State.
Scenario 3: Financial Non-compliance
Reform UK councils could refuse to administer or distribute funds provided by central government for asylum support, or reallocate resources away from services that would support areas with asylum accommodation.
This could trigger financial audits and interventions by the Secretary of State. In extreme cases, as with the rate-capping rebellion, individual councillors could face personal surcharges for financial mismanagement, and central government could take direct control of the council’s finances.
Scenario 4: Coordinated Legal Challenges
Perhaps the most legally sound approach would be coordinated, persistent legal challenges to every new hotel or accommodation conversion, based on detailed local planning policies. This would not be “going rogue” in the sense of breaking the law, but would represent unprecedented obstruction through legal means.
Even here, central government could respond by issuing Special Development Orders to override local planning decisions or introduce new legislation to streamline the use of properties for asylum accommodation.
Central government’s legal arsenal
If Reform UK councils attempt to block asylum accommodation, central government has several powerful tools at its disposal:
- Special Development Orders: The government can issue Special Development Orders to grant planning permission for asylum accommodation in specific locations, overriding local planning objections. This power was recently demonstrated with the Town and Country Planning (Former RAF Scampton) Special Development Order 2024.
- Secretary of State’s Intervention Powers: Under the Local Government Act 1999, the Secretary of State can intervene in local authorities deemed to be failing in their “best value duty” — a power used in cases like Rotherham Metropolitan Borough Council and London Borough of Tower Hamlets following governance failures.
- Financial Controls: A substantial portion of local authority funding comes from central government grants. By controlling the allocation and conditions attached to these grants, central government wields significant financial leverage over local authorities.
- Legislative Override: As the ultimate expression of parliamentary sovereignty, Parliament can enact new legislation to explicitly overrule or limit the scope of local policies that conflict with national interests.
The “rate-capping rebellion” of 1985 provides a somewhat useful parallel. Several left-wing Labour councils refused to set budgets within government-imposed limits, directly confronting Margaret Thatcher’s Conservative government. The standoff ended with the councils’ capitulation — some councillors were disqualified and surcharged, and all affected councils eventually complied with government measures.
This precedent suggests that direct defiance of central government carries significant risks for Reform UK councillors, including:
- Personal liability for unlawful decisions
- Potential disqualification from office
- Commissioner intervention and loss of council autonomy
- Financial penalties through withheld funding
Conclusion: Difficult but not impossible
What’s certain is that this issue will test the boundaries of local autonomy within England’s centralised system and highlight the fundamental tension between local democratic mandates and national policy imperatives in the politically charged domain of asylum accommodation.
Reform UK’s most practical advantage may simply be Britain’s slow bureaucracy. Planning appeals typically take 9-10 months, while judicial reviews often stretch beyond a year. By launching multiple challenges against asylum hotels and exhausting every procedural option, Reform councils could effectively block or disrupt asylum placements for years, potentially until the next election. This approach doesn’t require winning legal battles — merely keeping cases active in Britain’s backlogged system. The longer Reform can keep these disputes unresolved, the more they can demonstrate commitment to their campaign promises while building their case for greater local control over immigration matters.
Either way, Reform stands to benefit politically: they‘ll either demonstrate their ability to effect change at the local level or strengthen their narrative about the need for more radical reform of immigration policy and local government powers heading into the next general election.
