The recent furore surrounding the Trump administration’s imposition of tariffs on over 180 trading partners has reignited the debate over the existence of the so-called “Special Relationship”. This fabled partnership has a habit of reemerging in discussions whenever the US and UK are in close cooperation or in opposition to one another.
As the example of the Trump tariffs illustrates, there is no real benefit to the UK investing in this partnership
Despite burning hot and cold in the 79 years since Winston Churchill coined the term “Special Relationship”, there has always been a question over how real this relationship is for the more powerful partner. Whilst there are notable examples of close relations between US and UK leaders — Thatcher and Reagan or Blair and Bush — more recent relations demonstrate the slow decline of this relationship. Now, in the light of the newly announced tariffs on UK trade with the US, the UK must recognise the death of this “Special Relationship”. As the example of the Trump tariffs illustrates, there is no real benefit to the UK investing in this partnership. Yet there are real costs, diplomatic and reputational.
Winston Churchill coined the term “Special Relationship” for US-UK relations, highlighting the close cultural, economic, political, and historic ties between the two nations. Yet the closeness between Churchill and Truman was at least partly the result of the distrust of their wartime Soviet ally. Similarly, whilst some UK PMs have been known for their close relationship with their US interlocutors, this has largely been personality based rather than evidence of an enduring link. Indeed, Thatcher’s closeness to Reagan meant little when the US invaded Grenada or when Argentina invaded the Falklands.
Similarly, Blair is inextricably linked to his US counterpart George W Bush. Bush spoke volubly and favourably of the “Special Relationship” in 2002, as Blair stood beside him (both physically and metaphorically), making the case for invading Iraq. Despite all Blair’s work in drumming up support for the American War on Terror following 9/11, the UK’s involvement was quickly forgotten. The Biden administration gave the UK minimal warning before announcing their withdrawal from Afghanistan, and VP JD Vance appeared to dismiss the UK as “a random country that hasn’t fought a war in 30 years”.
As the announcement of Trump’s tariffs last week showed, the UK gets no special treatment for this “Special Relationship”. When needed as a partner, the US can dust off the trappings and terms of the partnership. Yet when the UK has a reciprocal need, these accoutrements are conspicuously absent. It is for this reason that the UK government should welcome this chance to accept the death of the “Special Relationship”.
Whilst some may point to the 10 per cent tariff rate imposed on UK exports to the US as a sign of “special” treatment, this is far from clear. The UK has had a 10 per cent tariff imposed, and in comparison to the 20 per cent on EU-US trade, this appears favourable. It may indeed be a “Brexit dividend”. Yet it is far from “special”. The 10 per cent tariff rate was announced as the base rate, the default. The UK shares this rate with an estimated 127 other US trade partners, over two-thirds of those targeted by US tariffs. Equally, the UK shares this rate with nations such as Morocco, Ethiopia, and Jamaica, none of whom are known for their opposition to the US, but neither are they associated with close relations. As such, the UK can’t see the base rate tariff as indicative of a positive result from the so-called Special Relationship, when those with remarkably neutral relations have received the same. Even Afghanistan under the Taliban has the same base rate tariff.
Crucially, the end of the “Special Relationship” does not mean the end of the US-UK relationship. This is merely a process of accepting normalcy in US-UK relations. Rather than expecting or seeking extra, or a better than normal deal, the UK would continue as a US ally while expecting no more than any other US ally. Not only is this a good way to manage UK disappointment with the US, it also frees up the UK’s understanding of diplomacy.
In divorcing the UK from this expectation, the UK could therefore feel more willing to stand arms-length from the US. We would be close but not bosom buddies. This stance would signal to British allies that they could be more open to coordinating the response to Trumpian tariffs.
This distance from the US could also free the UK from some of the expectations that the UK imposes upon itself due to this “Special Relationship”. US military officials’ comments about the UK military being unable to deploy, and no longer being a Tier 1 military power, would carry less heft absent the connotations of the “Special” tag. In acknowledging that so little comes in return for this specialness, the UK can reinvigorate its military capacity free from these kinds of comments from the peanut gallery. Once restored, the UK can continue to contribute where it sees common interest with US goals, as do other US allies. But in doing so, the UK does not need to self-impose the responsibilities of being a “special” partner.
Trump’s tariffs are not normal. In economic policy and in US-UK relations, they are the exception. Yet his predecessors were not starkly more positive towards the UK. Biden routinely had to defend himself from accusations of being “anti-British”, in part due to his reflexive and performative comments — “the BBC? I’m Irish” was illustrative. Beyond this, Biden ignored key UK events such as the Coronation, and barely acknowledged UK contributions to Western efforts in Ukraine. Obama had a tense relationship with David Cameron, and Boris Johnson’s accusatory and argumentative comments drawing allegations of racism didn’t help. But Obama’s comments on Brexit, and removal of the bust of Churchill from the Oval Office were perceived poorly in the UK. Notably, Justin Edwards reported a conversation with a senior Obama team member on the Churchill bust where they revealed that they were unsure on who it was the subject of the bust.
The UK routinely feels disappointed and even gaslit by the lack of purchase in the “Special Relationship”. Now, in light of the Trump administration’s sweeping imposition of tariffs, the UK has the opportunity to recognise the hollowness to this specialness. Moving away can bring the UK new diplomatic potential, preventing the UK from being tarred with the same brush as the US. Now more than ever, we have to accept that the “Special Relationship” is dead. We will be better off without it.
