The current incumbent of the White House presents daily challenges and quandaries for almost every other country on the planet—including his own. But for Taiwan, these carry a particular edge. The island which has enjoyed de facto independence from the Mainland since the end of the Civil War and the victory of the Communists there in 1949 survives now in a policy framework built on ambiguity and deliberate obfuscation. While not formally recognized as a nation by the US since it switched allegiance to Beijing in 1979, Taiwan is still tied by informal bonds to the world’s largest military and economic power.
It is true that these bonds have ebbed and flowed. President Reagan in the 1980s, despite being a hawk on China before his elevation to the White House, became more persuaded of the importance of building good relations with Beijing for American business interests. He undertook to sell less hi-tech military kit to Taipei. But that was in the days when both sides of the Strait were more alike and existed under one-party rule, with the Nationalists continuing their monopoly in the south and the Communist Party in the north. From the early 1990s, first in the Taiwanese legislature, then in the 1996 direct elections for president, democracy was introduced, and then thrived for the island. That deepened its alliances with the Political West by making it an ideological as well as a military and diplomatic partner.
Throughout the last half-century, the broad tramlines of US engagement with Taiwan have been built on two pillars. One is to abide by a “One China Policy,” where Washington “acknowledges” Beijing’s position that it was the sole government of the whole greater China area, while not conferring clear agreement with it. The other is to practice “strategic ambiguity” where, despite its evident political sympathies and preferences, the US has never overtly stated what it would do were China to undertake an aggressive move to resolve issues. Its mantra has continued unchanged: that only with an outcome where both sides agree on a single course of action, and are able to implement this peacefully, would the US concur. Otherwise, the current status quo of managed division must be maintained.
China, particularly under its present supreme leader Xi Jinping, has placed pressure on this situation. It has reaffirmed on countless occasions in recent years its intention to achieve reunification with rising levels of sharpness and intensity. The nationalist and populist tone of contemporary domestic politics in the country, where the aim is to “make China great again” rules supreme, explains why the Taiwan issue has taken priority above all others. On top of this, with the world’s second largest military, and with a budget that rises each year, these days Beijing has not just the will but the means to do more than ever before to achieve its great dream.
This posture of Beijing has to be put alongside the atmosphere in Taiwan itself. Since 2016, it has been under the once-outlawed Democratic Progressive Party’s governance. They have historically been far more supportive of a stronger autonomy for their island. Indeed the current president, William Lai Ching-te, elected in early 2024, could be called the most independence-leaning that has ever held that office since 1996. Needless to say, he is not a popular figure in Beijing. It is unlikely that any face-to-face meetings between him and President Xi will happen any time soon.
Taiwan maintains a balancing act, too. After President Trump complained about Taiwan’s dominance in the production of semiconductors, the island’s key company in this area, the Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company, committed to a massive investment in the US. Whether this will allow the US to become more self-reliant in the production of this critically important component of the modern global technology and economic infrastructure is hard to say. On top of this, Taiwan has upped its defense expenditure from under 2% to well above it now. That took heed of Trump’s criticism about it depending too much on its informal allies and not footing its own security bill.
When the global list of tariffs was released on April 2nd this year, Taiwan received a grim reminder of the new geopolitics. While China was hit initially with 34% on all imported goods, Taiwan did little better at 32%. Granted, the figure for China rapidly escalated, and Taiwan was put in the group given a 90-day reprieve down to 10%. Even so, it was a reminder that for the White House, being a democracy and presenting as a valued ally are no longer going to go very far. Taiwan these days has to earn its support and favor.
The more adventurous wonder whether America, as it seeks a grand new trade and economic deal with China, might even use Taiwan as a negotiable entity. It is not beyond the realms of fantasy to imagine a jovial Trump sitting huddled over a table with someone he has often said he admires, Xi Jinping, and cutting a deal, where the island is simply thrown in as part of the package. Even back in the days of Nixon and Henry Kissinger, the latter referred at times to how, as the US moved closer to Beijing, any move in Taipei that could be read as making a bid for complete independence would result in the US’s ire and loss of support. These days, as never before, the Taiwanese must feel like they live at the mercy of others.
From the 1970s, the One China Policy and strategic ambiguity, for all their many faults and limitations, have at least maintained a workable peace. While the Russo–Ukrainian War continues and the Middle East suffers yet more turbulence and strife, at the very least for all the tensions one can say that across the Strait there has been no bloodshed, and no fatalities. We have to remind ourselves too that if Beijing did feel like its time had come and that the US would do nothing to defend Taiwan, any war or act of aggression it launched would create a new world—one where China and the US faced each other not as competitors, but as outright adversaries. This would be a new world, one more profoundly divided even than the current troubled situation.
Taiwanese who sit at the heart of this often feel they are the playthings of larger and more powerful forces. But that doesn’t mean their voices shouldn’t be heard. And while they state consistently in surveys how they increasingly feel Taiwanese, not Chinese, they also show they support the status quo and do not want radical, destabilizing change. The outside world needs to listen to them. It is, after all, they rather than the remote politicians of Washington and Beijing who will take the brunt if anything goes wrong.
Additional Reading:
Appeasing China, Backing Taiwan? by Doug Bandow
Taiwan’s Wealth Shows Cuba’s Poverty Is the Result of Socialism, Not a Blockade by Emmanuel Rincón
