Israel’s airstrike on Doha earlier this month didn’t just blow up Israel–Hamas negotiations—it shifted the fault lines of regional security. The strike killed five Hamas members, including the son of a senior leader, in Doha’s Leqtaifiya district. Qatar, a major non-NATO U.S. ally that hosts the Al Udeid Air Base—America’s largest military installation in the region—condemned the attack as “cowardly and treacherous.” Israel’s Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu defended the strike as a blow against Hamas.
Israel’s strike on Qatar, framed as a counterterrorism operation, raises an alarming possibility: that Turkey, a NATO member, could be next. Like Qatar, Ankara hosts members of Hamas and offers them political cover in ways Israel sees as detrimental to its security interests. Turkey also houses U.S. nuclear weapons at Incirlik Air Base and remains a cornerstone of the transatlantic alliance. If Israel was willing to bomb Doha under the pretext of fighting Hamas, it could deploy the same rationale for an attack on Turkish soil. And if Turkey, in response to such an attack, solicited American and European support under Article 5—NATO’s collective defense provision—and if such support was not forthcoming, the foundations of the alliance would be severely undermined.
To fully comprehend the risks at play, one must look at the broader trajectory of Israeli–Turkish relations. Ties have steadily deteriorated since at least the start of Israel’s assault on Gaza in October 2023. President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has even accused Israel of committing a “genocide” in Gaza. The deterioration of bilateral ties accelerated after Israel’s surprise attack on Iran this June.
Meanwhile, both countries have expanded their military presence in Syria since the ouster last December of President Bashar al-Assad. Israel has carried out repeated strikes on Syrian airbases in Hama and Homs to block Turkish deployment of air defenses and drones that could challenge its aerial dominance. Turkish officials have accused Israel of “expansionist aims” and of undermining Syria’s fragile interim government. Reports of close encounters between Israeli and Turkish aircraft in Syrian airspace prompted “technical talks” to avoid accidental clashes.
The tension between Turkey and Israel is now being exacerbated by the presence of Hamas in Ankara. Turkey, like Qatar, does not designate Hamas as a terrorist organization, and its willingness to host the group has long frustrated the Israeli government. Israel’s strike in Doha demonstrates its willingness to strike the sovereign territory of U.S. allies to decapitate Hamas. That precedent makes a future strike on Turkey no longer unthinkable. Some Mideast outlets have even reported that Israel considered striking Hamas in Turkey before opting for Qatar. The Lebanese daily Al-Akhbar said that Israel scrapped the initial plan for fear of sparking a diplomatic crisis by striking a NATO member.
Any Israeli aggression against Turkey, whether through missiles and bombs or a covert operation by Mossad, would undoubtedly test NATO’s integrity. Article 5 stipulates that an armed attack against one or more members should be considered an attack against all, but would the alliance truly come to Turkey’s aid against Israel? Given the pro-Israel orientation of the Trump administration and of Washington broadly, the U.S. would not intervene militarily at Tukey’s behest against Israel. Furthermore, with European governments already stretched by Ukraine and broadly sympathetic to Israel, they too would likely offer Turkey little to no meaningful support.
If Turkey’s appeal to Article 5 were unsuccessful, the consequences could be severe. Erdoğan has long hinted at the possibility of exiting NATO; the kind of crisis imagined above could turn threats into reality. Moreover, the alliance’s deterrent power would collapse, possibly prompting other members to wonder whether devoting substantial military and financial resources to NATO is still worthwhile.
An Israeli attack on Turkey would also cast doubts upon America’s umbrella across the Middle East, doubts already shared by many following Israel’s strike on Qatar. If Washington could not stop Israel from bombing a country that hosts its largest regional base, what protection can Jordan, Egypt, or the Gulf states expect? For many U.S. partners, the strike and the Trump administration’s unwillingness to punish Israel for it raises the question of what American security guarantees mean in practice.
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Washington’s credibility has already eroded through its unwavering support for Israel. Since October 2023, the United States has vetoed multiple UN resolutions calling for a ceasefire in Gaza while supplying Israel with weaponry and financial aid subsidized by American taxpayers. In the West Bank, U.S. backing has enabled settlement expansion and military raids that have displaced tens of thousands of Palestinians. In Lebanon, Israeli forces remain despite agreements for them to withdraw, and Israel has violated a ceasefire by conducting strikes that have killed dozens of civilians. By shielding Israel from accountability, Washington has tied its own reputation to Israel’s wars, whether in Gaza, the West Bank, or southern Lebanon.
The Trump administration’s tolerance for Netanyahu’s Doha strike may appear to be just one more example of the close U.S.–Israel partnership, but the implications are profound. Israel has now demonstrated a willingness to strike the heart of U.S. allies. If Turkey becomes its next target, NATO could face a crisis unlike any in its history.
For Americans, this is not about whether one sides with Turkey, Qatar, or Israel. It is about whether America should sacrifice its alliances and credibility to enable a client state’s reckless military decisions. By backing Israel’s new course, Washington risks undermining not only Turkey’s security but also the very alliance system that has defined Western security for generations. The main threat to NATO may come not from Moscow or Beijing, nor from declining support for the alliance in Washington, but from a small country in the Middle East that increasingly acts against the interests of its superpower patron.
