Israel’s Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is riding high. His decision to short-circuit U.S. diplomacy with Tehran by bombing Iran’s nuclear sites, coupled with his successful attempt to enlist President Donald Trump in the effort, has paid off considerably for him over the short term. A final battle damage assessment notwithstanding, there’s no question that Iran’s main nuclear facilities at Natanz, Fordow, and Isfahan were seriously damaged. Iran’s nuclear industrial base took a hit as well, with at least 10 of its nuclear scientists killed during the 12-day air campaign. The entire effort has given Netanyahu—who has been fighting for his political life since the October 7, 2023 Hamas attack severely degraded his “Mr. Security” persona—a new lease on life.
Netanyahu’s short rise in the polls has generated a bevy of speculation that the prime minister now possesses the political flexibility to finally end the nearly 21-month-long war in Gaza, which can charitably be described as a long slog with an unclear end-point. President Trump added more speculation to the pile Tuesday, when he alleged that Israel “agreed to the necessary conditions” for a 60-day truce. Senior Israeli officials have claimed that denting Iran’s military power has opened up new possibilities for Israeli foreign policy in the Middle East. Netanyahu himself has teased the “many opportunities” that have been created now that Tehran has been dealt with. The Israeli premier’s meeting with the U.S. at the White House next week, and Trump’s call on Truth Social to end the war in Gaza with a ceasefire deal that releases hostages, is only adding to the anticipation.
So, is a groundbreaking deal on Gaza really in sight?
For those of us who have long worried that Israel’s goals in Gaza, especially “eradicating Hamas,” were unattainable, terminating the war through negotiation—or at least undergoing a serious diplomatic effort to achieve a cessation of violence—is a very appealing prospect. There’s some logic to the notion that Netanyahu’s successful gamble in Iran provides him enough goodwill, both with the Israeli public and within his governing coalition, to finally close the door on a conflict that has sullied Israel’s international reputation and taxed its military.
But this presumes that Netanyahu now deems Israel’s war aims in Gaza to be unattainable or unworthy of the cost, or that he has somehow turned into a peacenik after a good night’s sleep. Evidence for such presumptions is lacking. Alternatively, it presumes that Trump, who often speaks about the need to get all of the hostages back and even approved direct U.S. negotiations with Hamas, a designated foreign terrorist organization, to free the last American citizen still in Gaza, will actually put the screws on Netanyahu to end the war. This, too, isn’t a given, and if past actions are a predictor of future events, then we shouldn’t be surprised if Trump just moves on to bigger things and continues to delegate American policy on Gaza to Netanyahu.
Before we buy into the budding narrative, we need to splash some ice-cold water on our faces and let reality sink in. In particular, we need to consider the war aims and political incentives of Netanyahu, whose choices will determine the fate of the proposed ceasefire.
First and foremost, there is no evidence thus far that Netanyahu’s position on Gaza has moved an inch since the war with Iran concluded in a Trump-imposed ceasefire. Although the Israelis may talk vaguely about newfound opportunities to settle the conflict, the terms they’re offering are just as rigid now as they were in March, when the last ceasefire collapsed. Hamas’s terms haven’t changed much either, which means both sides continue to be locked in an irreconcilable, concrete maze that is impossible to escape. Hamas is willing to free the remaining 50 or so hostages (only 20 of whom are believed to be alive) if Israel ends the war permanently and withdraws its troops from Gaza; Netanyahu is only willing to end the war if Hamas releases all the hostages, disarms itself, and flies its leaders into exile.
The U.S., Qatar, and Egypt have all served as mediators, periodically poking and prodding both sides into compromise, but their pleadings have largely fallen on deaf ears. Trump’s Middle East envoy Steve Witkoff tried to create some common ground by proposing a formula back in May that would trade a 60-day ceasefire and accelerated aid shipments into Gaza for the release of half of the hostages, yet Hamas is highly opposed to signing on to any arrangement that leaves Israel with the option of resuming the war again. Netanyahu, in turn, is highly reluctant to sign on to anything that ties his hands and takes that option away from him. This is the same problem that ruined the Trump administration’s previous truce in the spring, when Israel chose to return to war rather than extend the ceasefire by a few more weeks. That event was a major wake-up call to Hamas, and the lesson was clear: don’t agree to anything with Israel until the Americans guarantee that Israel will accept a permanent truce.
Israeli military operations inside Gaza aren’t losing steam—in fact, they’re getting even more intense. As the world was fixated on the missile attacks and airstrikes between Israel and Iran, hundreds of people were killed in Gaza as Israeli jets and artillery blasted away at highly-populated areas in what the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) insist were Hamas positions. More than 70 people were killed on Tuesday alone, with more than 20 losing their lives just trying to get humanitarian assistance. The IDF has yet again ordered mandatory evacuations of large swaths of northern Gaza, and Israeli tanks are making forays into Gaza City in a bid to root out Hamas in the area. While one could claim these actions are designed to squeeze Hamas even further in the lead-up to renewed ceasefire negotiations, one can just as easily claim that Netanyahu is doubling down on his pledge to defeat Hamas militarily—in which case there isn’t much diplomacy to engage in.
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And let’s not forget about the domestic politics Netanyahu needs to manage. Yes, his approval ratings have increased a bit, courtesy of the war in Iran, which could theoretically reduce the stranglehold that ultra-nationalist, anti-Arab extremists like Itamar Ben-Gvir and Bezalel Smotrich hold over him. Yet we shouldn’t pretend that these two cabinet ministers and the parties they lead don’t remain a crucial voting bloc for the PM, who, after all, remains an unpopular political figure and is mired in several corruption cases. Needless to say, both of these men would rather jump off the Allenby Bridge than be associated with ending the war in Gaza, a territory the two hope to congest with Israeli settlements and annex as part of Israel. Is Netanyahu willing to bet his political future (and perhaps his freedom) on a new election when the results could turn out poorly for him? Anything is possible—and we shouldn’t discount Netanyahu’s ability to enact new political alliances to keep himself afloat—but it would be a risky bet for a man who prefers stability and predictability.
Ultimately, whether or not the war in Gaza is cut short will likely depend on Donald Trump. Next week’s meeting with Netanyahu at the White House will focus at least in part on the Gaza file, and one can imagine Trump browbeating the Israeli premier to end the conflict and get to work on other projects in the Middle East that the president cares about—Israeli-Saudi normalization, a peace deal between Israel and the new Syrian government, and perhaps a similar arrangement between Israel and Lebanon. But, as mentioned, it’s hardly assured that Trump will pressure the Israelis beyond tough rhetoric; previous Trump entreaties towards this end have largely gone in one ear and out the other, with Netanyahu stonewalling the request and Trump deferring to whatever the Israelis want to do.
Have any of these dynamics changed? We’ll soon find out. The answer will determine whether Trump’s wider Middle East agenda has a shot or whether it’s stuck in purgatory.
